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Mediation's Potential Role in International
Cultural Property Disputes
NATE MEALY*
"Mortal!"' -'twas thus she spoke- "that blush of shame
Proclaims thee Briton, once a noble name;
First of the might, foremost of the free,
Now honour'd less by all, and least by me;
Chief of thy foes shall Pallas still be found.
Seek'st thou the cause of loathing?-look around.
Lo! Here, despite war and wasting fire,
I saw successive tyrannies expire.
"Scaped from the ravage of the Turk and Goth,
Thy country sends a spoiler worse than both.
Survey this vacant, violated fane;
Recount the relic torn that yet remain:
These Cecrops placed, this Pericles adorn 'd
That Adrian rear'd when drooping Science mourn 'd.
What more I owe let gratitude attest-
Know, Alaric and Elgin did the rest.
That all may learn from whence the plunderer came,
The insulted wall sustains his hated name... 
I. INTRODUCTION
The clandestine looting of the world's archaeological and artistic
heritage is a substantial problem.2 From every corner of the world come
* J.D. Candidate 2011, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
I GEORGE GORDON, The Curse of Minerva, in BYRON'S POETICAL WORKS 142, 143
(1945), available at http://www.mykeep.com/lordbyron/curseofminerva.html. This poem
recounts Lord Byron's shame at the desecration of the Parthenon at the hands of his
countryman, Lord Elgin.
2 Scholars estimate that the antiquities black market is third only to the drug and
arms trades in the billions of dollars it generates on a yearly basis. Tjaco T. van den Hout,
Introduction, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING
FROM THE SEVENTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR i, xviii (Int'l Bureau of the
Permanent Ct. of Arb. ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 2004); see also Jordana Hughes, Note, The
Trend Toward Liberal Enforcement of Repatriation Claims in Cultural Property
Disputes, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 131 (2000).
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horror stories about its scope and degree.3 In Mali, for example, looters have
illegally excavated and sold thousands of artifacts abroad. The artifacts were
produced by 600-year-old Sub-Saharan empires, 8,000-year-old Neolithic
African hunter-gatherers, and the 500-year-old Dogon people. 4 In some
places in Mali, looters have left behind landscapes blanketed with hundreds
of pits-some as many as ten feet deep-out of which they have extracted
African history.5 It is estimated that 45% of Mali's archaeological sites have
been looted to date. 6 From Europe comes word that Italy has suffered, among
other things, the undocumented loss of over 4,000 Apulian vases from
previously undisturbed ancient tombs.7 Another European country, Bulgaria,
suffered similarly when thieves stole 5,000 icons from important religious
and archaeological sites in 1992 across the country.8 Latin America has also
failed to escape the din of illegal shovels and backhoes. Looting is so
prevalent there that entire civilizations were ripped from the earth and placed
For the purposes of this article, "looting" occurs when an object of archaeological or
historical import is "removed illegally from archaeological context" and illicitly sold
abroad. JOHN CARMAN, AGAINST CULTURAL PROPERTY: ARCHAEOLOGY, HERITAGE AND
OWNERSHIP 17 (Richard Hodges ed., 2005). Such objects "include those excavated from
sites in territories where all archaeological remains belong under law to the state; or when
this does not apply, from sites which are subject to legal controls and protection; or to
particular materials which are the property of the state regardless of context of
disposition." Id. It is important to note that many scholars and treaties also consider
objects taken from museums to be loot. Id. A recent example of this later defimition of
loot finds meaning in the thousands of artifacts stolen from the National Museum of Iraq
shortly after the recent fall of Saddam Hussein. Andrd Emmerich, Improving the Odds:
Preservation through Distribution, in WHO OWNS THE PAST? CULTURAL POLICY,
CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 247, 247 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2007).
3 For case studies detailing the effects of looting in Thailand, Cambodia, China,
India, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, the Republic of Niger, Belize, the United States, Syria,
Jordan, Turkey, Cyprus, Italy, and Greece, see TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE (Neil Brodie, Jennifer
Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001).
4 Joshua Hammer, Looting Mali, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 2009, at 33, 36. France alone,
for example, intercepted 10,150 Malian artifacts from 2005 to 2007. Id. at 37. Some
artifacts taken from Mali have sold at auction for as much as $275,000. Id. at 39.
5 Id. at 40.
6 CARMAN, supra note 2, at 16.
7 Ricardo J. Elia, Analysis of the Looting, Selling, and Collecting of Apulian Red-
Figure Vases: A Quantitative Approach, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 145, 145-46 (Neil Brodie,
Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001).
8 CARMAN, supra note 2, at 16.
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onto the international antiquities market before scholars even knew they
existed.9 From Guatemala alone, looters smuggle up to 1,000 ancient pots a
month.' 0 Some estimate that looting in Central America employs several
million people."1
Looting has two harmful consequences. First, looting denies many
countries the ability to control and appreciate their histories and identities to
the fullest possible extent because it strips countries of historical objects
which they claim inform the pasts of their lands. 12 Second, looting decreases
archaeology's ability to investigate the past at its most undisturbed and,
therefore, informative state. 13 Thus, it should come as no surprise that source
nations-nations from which the world and its museums derive their
collections-have begun to demand the return of objects removed from their
borders in ways which violate either their laws or alleged international
norms. 14 So resonating are their claims that on November 14, 1970, the
United Nation's Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
(UNESCO) adopted the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property (UNESCO Convention). 15 The UNESCO Convention, to which 120
States are party, 16 purports to make it illegal for States Parties and their
9 ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY: TOMB RAIDERS, SMUGGLERS, AND THE
LOOTING OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 12-13, 100 (2004).
10 CARMAN, supra note 2, at 16.
11 David Matsuda, Subsistence Diggers, in WHO OWNS THE PAST? CULTURAL
POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 255, 261 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2007).
12 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, pmbl, Nov. 14, 1970, 96
Stat. 2350, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
13 Clemency Chase Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, in WHO OWNS THE
PAST? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 221, 221 (Kate Fitz
Gibbon ed., 2007). When archaeologists excavate, the relation objects have to one
another and their physical surroundings are almost as informative as the information
gleaned from the objects themselves. Id. Therefore, when a looter breaks into a site and
removes its treasures, his or her actions destroy an object's context and thereby render the
site and whatever he or she has taken almost completely worthless. Id.
14 jAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? MUSEUMS AND THE BATTLE OVER OUR
ANCIENT HERITAGE xxxii (2008).
15 UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, pmbl.
16 UNESCO, States Parties to the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
(2010), http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO = 13039&
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citizens or institutions to import, export, or transfer cultural property in
contravention of the patrimony laws of other States Parties. 17 It does this
because, in its opinion, a country's "cultural property constitutes one of the
basic elements of civilization and national culture ... and ... its true value
can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information
regarding its origin, history and traditional setting." 18
However, despite the intentions of the UNESCO Convention and the
goodwill of a number of States Parties, many source nations struggle to
regain looted cultural property from the countries to which it was exported.
Sometimes this occurs because the importing country either failed to ratify
the Convention or adopted it with Convention-neutering reservations. 19 Other
times, an importing country might feel legally obligated to repatriate looted
cultural property, but it does not think that the protesting source nation has
presented it with enough evidence to prove that the property it holds was
illegally exported in the first place.20 These realities leave us with three
categories of cultural property which could be the subject of repatriation
claims: (1) that which source nations can prove was illegally exported in
contravention of their laws,21 (2) that which source nations cannot prove was
language=E&order=alpha (last visited Aug. 19, 2010). This URL address links directly to
UNESCO's record of which Nations have ratified or accepted the Convention or have
issued a notification of succession.
17 UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, art. 3 ("The import, export or transfer of
ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this
Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be illicit."). Article 1 of the Convention
defines cultural property as "property which, on religious or secular grounds, is
specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science." Id. art. 1. Such property must also fall into a category
such as "property relating to history," products of proper and clandestine archaeological
excavations, "elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which
have been dismembered," antiquities over 100 years old, and pictures, paintings,
sculptures, and engravings. Id. Because of Articles 1 and 3, States Parties have almost
absolute power in determining what constitutes cultural property and whether or not that
property may leave their borders. Kevin F. Jowers, Comment, International and National
Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention, the United
States, and Mexico, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 145, 151 (2003).
18 UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, pmbl.
19 See infra Part II.
20 Id.
21 An example of this type of cultural property is that of Turkey's famed "Lydian
Hoard." SHARON WAXMAN, LOOT: THE BATTLE OVER THE STOLEN TREASURES OF THE
ANCIENT WORLD 149 (2008). The Lydian Hoard, a collection of 363 gold and silver
pieces (e.g., acorn-shaped pendants hung from a golden necklace, bracelets decorated
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illegally exported from their borders, though circumstantial evidence
suggests that this was the case, 22 and (3) that which was exported from their
borders long before it was illegal to do so.23 This latter category of cultural
property is particularly contentious because it usually involves works that
source nations consider so essential to their national identities that separation
from them amounts to some type of sociopolitical insult. 24 The second
with lions' heads, silver bowls, and a golden broach in the shape of a hippocampus) from
the Lydian Kingdom circa 500 B.C.E., sat in the Metropolitan Museum of Art from 1966
to 1993. Id. at 146-51. In 1993, Turkey convinced the looters-small farmers from the
Turkish towns of Gure and Usak-to admit that they had broken into a tomb, stolen the
Hoard, and sold it illegally to a middle man who shipped it out of Turkey, counter to a
Turkish cultural patrimony law claiming all such finds for the State. Id. at 148-49. Armed
with this type of evidence, Turkey filed a lawsuit in Manhattan federal court against the
Met. Id. at 150. This suit quickly encouraged the Museum to return the Hoard lest it face
criminal charges under U.S. stolen property laws. Id.
22 An example of this type of cultural property is the Cleveland Museum of Art's
(CMA) bronze statue of Apollo Sauroktonos (Apollo the Lizard-Slayer). Steven Litt, God
of Mystery: Gaps in Our Apollo s History Makes It a Focus of Debate over Global
Antiquities Trade, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 17, 2008, at J1. Greece alleges that
the statue was illegally fished out of the Ionian Sea in the early 1990s. Id. To back this
claim, Greece has noted that the statue's "official" history of ownership has large gaps in
it, which suggest that at some point the history of ownership was falsified to appear as if
it had come from a private collection assembled over 100 years ago when it was legal to
remove such works from Greece. Id. Given that, the statue's legal status remains
uncertain because specialists at the CMA allege that they have scientific evidence
proving that the bronze statue has aged in a manner consistent with sitting for a century in
a museum collection, not at the bottom of the sea for thousands of years. Id.
23 See CUNO, supra note 14, at 9.
24 The most notable example of this type of cultural property is the Elgin Marbles-
portions of the 2,500-year-old frieze, metopes, and sculpted figures that used to line the
top of the Parthenon. Kate Fitz Gibbon, The Elgin Marbles: A Summary, in WHO OWNS
THE PAST? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 109, 109-11 (Kate
Fitz Gibbon ed., 2007). From 1801 to 1812, Thomas Bruce, seventh Earl of Elgin and the
British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, systematically chiseled the works named
after him off the Parthenon with permission from an apathetic Ottoman official. Id at
109. In 1816, he sold the collection to the British Museum. Id. at 113. It sits there to this
day despite Greece's continued requests for its return. Id. at 113-14. Another example is
the Rosetta Stone, which also resides in the British Museum. CUNo, supra note 14, at xii.
Discovered by a French military officer in Rosetta, Egypt in 1799, the Stone lists in
Egyptian hieroglyphics, Egyptian demotic, and ancient Greek "the terms of an agreement
between a synod of Egyptian priests and the Macedonian ruler of Egypt, Ptolemy V, on
March 27, 196 B.C." Id. Even though the content of the Stone is relatively insignificant, it
is one of history's most important finds because it gave Jean-Frangois Champollion the
ability to decipher Egyptian hieroglyphics in the early 1800s. Id. at xiii. The Egyptian
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category usually involves pieces in either private or museum collections
which have no provenance. 25 Unprovenanced pieces bear no origination
information. Therefore, if a source nation believes that an unprovenanced
piece in a foreign collection was discovered within and illegally exported
from its borders, the nation will have to rely on relatively unpersuasive
evidence to prove its ownership claim: e.g., the object's patina buildup,26 the
artist or civilization responsible for its creation, 27 or the object-unique
indents it allegedly left in the earth of its source nation.28 Some scholars
persuasively argue that the majority of the world's private and museum
collections consist of looted goods because (a) the majority of these
collections contain unprovenanced pieces, and (b) if an object were
government has repeatedly called for the Stone's return because of its importance to the
understanding of ancient Egyptian history and its discovery within Egypt's borders. Id. at
xiv. The British have refused to return the Stone, arguing that at the time of its taking
there was no independent Egyptian state and therefore the current Egyptian state has no
claim of ownership upon which it can plead its case. Id.
25 An object's "provenance" is its core biographical information, i.e., when it was
found, where it was found, and who has owned the object since it was found. CUNO,
supra note 14, at xv.
26 See Litt, supra note 22, at J1. Some objects build a patina-a chemical coating-
on their surfaces in response to various environmental factors. See NINA BURLEIGH,
UNHOLY BUSINESS: A TRUE TALE OF FAITH, GREED AND FORGERY IN THE HOLY LAND 34
(2008). Scientists can examine patinas to assess everything from an object's age to the
environment in which it has resided since it was excavated. See id. This is significant
because it is possible for museums to argue that unprovenanced objects subject to
repatriation claims were in their collections long before it became illegal to export those
objects from their source nations. Using patina analysis, source nations can try to prove
that museums are lying-that according to the chemical buildup on an object, it has spent
years in the ground rather than in a sterile museum environment as claimed.
27 See CUNO, supra note 14, at xxxii, 9. Such an argument may go something like
this: because an object is the product of ancient empire A and modem nation B
geographically exists in the same place as A, anything made by A must come from B's
territory. Thus, anything made by A belongs to B.
28 For example, in a New York case to recover a fourth-century copper cauldron and
the Roman silver it contained, the Republic of Hungary claimed that the cauldron and the
silver originated in the Republic because the cauldron allegedly left a cauldron-sized
indent in the earth of the wine cellar in which Hungary thought the cauldron was hidden
before it and its silver were sold abroad. Harvey Kurzweil, Leo V. Gagion & Ludovic De
Walden, The Trial of the Sevso Treasure: What a Nation Will Do in the Name of Its
Heritage, in WHO OWNS THE PAST: CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE
LAw 83, 86 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2007). This argument ultimately failed when it
surfaced that a wine cask made the indentation. Id. at 87.
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excavated and exported legally or during a time before patrimony laws, logic
dictates that there would be no reason to display it sans provenance. 29
Source nations have begun placing total embargos on the export of any
cultural property found within their borders-whether licitly or illicitly
discovered-because of the repatriation struggles they face, the rate at which
cultural property exits their borders via illegal back channels, and the
UNESCO Convention's license to declare whatever they find to be
"historically important protected cultural property. '30 These types of
protections, which some call "cultural patrimony laws" and others
"nationalist retentionist cultural property laws,"31 are problematic because
they threaten to stifle the legitimate international trade of cultural property; a
trade which undermines "parochialism and ignorance," develops "citizens'
tastes and sympathies," broadens horizons, enriches education, and
stimulates the creation of new art and international understanding. 32 Imagine
a scenario in which museums and private collectors all around the world will
no longer be able to acquire pieces excavated in nations in which they do not
reside.33 If the systems in place to deal with the import and export of cultural
29 Christopher Chippindale & David W.J. Gill, Material Consequence of
Contemporary Classical Collecting, 104 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 463, 464, 476 (2000).
This study bases its conclusions upon an examination of the collections of seven of the
world's finest museums: Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York; the J. Paul Getty
Museum of Art in Los Angeles, California; the Royal Academy of Arts in London; the
Israel Museum in Jerusalem; the Fitzwilliam Museum at the University of Cambridge;
the Arthur M. Sackler Art Museum of the Harvard Art Museums; and the San Antonio
Museum of Art. Id. at 465-66. Chippindale and Gill conclude that of the 1,396 pieces
examined, 1,045 displayed no provenance. Id. at 476.
30 PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 38 (U. Chi. Press 1983); see
also CUNO, supra note 14, at 33-34; Hughes, supra note 2, at 132.
31 CUNO, supra note 14, at xxxiv.
32 BATOR, supra note 30, at 30-32.
33 Some might argue that museums can always turn to the black market for looted
goods, thus preserving the public's access to objects of historical import. However, this
option is becoming more unlikely each day for two reasons. First, reputable museums all
across the world, starting with The University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology
and Anthropology in 1970, have begun to declare that they will no longer purchase
unprovenanced (i.e., looted) objects. CUNO, supra note 14, at 29-30. Second, with the
improvement of modem communication, the advent of the Internet and online cataloging,
and heightened source nation watchfulness, museums no longer function unchecked.
Hughes, supra note 2, at 147. Instead, some source nations watch the museums within
their borders and their acquisitions like hawks, just waiting to identify an object of
questionable origin. Id.
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property remain unchanged, then this is exactly the type of artistically-stifled
and jingoistic world in which we and our children may someday live.34
This note discusses the repatriation of cultural property and proposes that
mediation, a form of alternative dispute resolution, might be the best means
by which source nations could equitably regain exported objects over which
they claim cultural ownership. It accomplishes these two tasks in three parts.
Part II discusses how market nations-nations which import cultural
property-regulate foreign art, artifacts, and antiquities in ways which
undermine the intent of the UNESCO Convention. Part III defines mediation
and, through a comparative analysis of other international dispute resolution
mechanisms, outlines why mediation is the best means by which the world
can equitably settle its international cultural property disputes. Part IV, taking
the mediation principles that the second section highlights, identifies all the
disputant-stakeholders invested in the international trade of cultural
property--e.g., market and source nations, museums, archaeologists, and the
public-and briefly describes their interests. This part also presents a few
options for disputant-stakeholders to consider when they engage in mediation
over the repatriation of cultural property.
II. MARKET NATIONS, TREATIES, AND CULTURAL PROPERTY REGIMES
This section examines the interaction between the UNESCO Convention
and market nation laws governing the transfer of cultural property in order to
prove that, as applied, they fail to equitably protect the interests of source
nations. 35 The laws discussed herein come from five market nations who
34 There are a few examples of systemic failures already occurring. For example,
when the Louvre refused to negotiate the return of a series of Pharonic antiquities, Egypt
declared that it would no longer cooperate with France to display legally-acquired
Egyptian antiquities in any French museums. Christophe de Roquefeuil, Egypt Breaks
Ties with France's Louvre Museum, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, Oct. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 1
08575&catid=l&Itemid=183. Another such example comes from 2007, when Italy
threatened to completely embargo the export of Italian antiquities to the J. Paul Getty
Museum in Los Angeles, California unless the Getty agreed to return over forty pieces of
Italy's stolen cultural property. Diane Haithman, Getty Accord Lands Rarity, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2009, at Cl.
35 There is another treaty which seeks to govern the trade of cultural property: the
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M.
1330, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty
/1995culturalproperty-e.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. Like the UNESCO
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possess some of the world's largest collections of foreign cultural property:
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia.36
It is important to note that where market nations have passed laws which
acknowledge the interests of source nations (some of which are allegedly "in
conjunction" with the UNESCO Convention), those laws only apply to
cultural property that entered their borders after the enactment of their own
cultural property laws and those of the source nations themselves. Thus,
source nations currently have no legal recourse to recover cultural property
taken from within their borders before the world became legally sensitive to
its value to national identity.37 This means that, of the three categories of
cultural property mentioned in the Part I, under current legal regimes market
nations will only consider returning cultural property which (a) they or their
citizens have acquired in roughly the past twenty years and (b) source
nations can prove was looted.38 Furthermore, whereas the UNESCO
Convention leaves it to source nations to define what constitutes protected
cultural property, the cultural property laws that market nations enact (even
those who have allegedly ratified the UNESCO Convention) reserve that
power for the market nations themselves.39 Therefore, unless a market nation
chooses to declare that an object is the protected cultural property of a source
nation, no amount of source nation protest will subject that object to
repatriation under current legal regimes.40 This is the current status of the
Convention, the UNIDROIT Convention orders States Parties to return stolen and illegal
exported "cultural objects" to source nations who request their return. Id. art. 1. This
paper does not discuss this Convention because the international community has almost
completely ignored it. See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, Status of Signature Ratification Entry into Force and Declarations,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/English/implement/i-95.pdf. It has been ignored for
two reasons. First, source nations do not like the fact that articles 4(1) and 6(1) of the
UNIDROIT Convention require that they pay restitution to the current "owners" of their
cultural property. S.R.M. MACKENZIE, GOING, GOING, GONE: REGULATING THE MARKET
IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES 95 (Inst. of Art and Law 2005). Second, the UNIDROIT
Convention gives source nations so much leeway in what they may define as their
cultural property subject to repatriation that source nations do not want to ratify the
Convention and subject themselves and their citizens to unreasonable repatriation claims.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 35, art. 2.
36 See BATOR, supra note 30, at 16.
37 See generally infra Part II.
38 See supra Part I.
39 BATOR, supra note 30, at 51.
40 See generally infra Part II.
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cultural property world. It is an uphill, litigation-based battle in which source
nations have few rights and little chance of success.
A. Cultural Property Regulation in the United States
The United States is one of the world's leading collectors of art,
antiquities, and objects of historic import. Its museums-e.g., the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, the J. Paul Getty Museum, and the Cleveland
Museum of Art-are world-renowned for their collections. Its private citizens
hold vast amounts of culturally significant works as well. As a depository of
so much of the world's history, source nations regularly accuse Americans
and their museums of acquiring cultural property that was illegally exported
from their borders. Because the U.S. ratified the UNESCO Convention, it
would be natural to assume that the Convention's precepts-i.e., that no
nation will retain ownership of cultural property taken from another in
contravention of the other's laws-would apply to the U.S., and that the U.S.
would therefore regularly repatriate objects that source nations call their
cultural property. However, that is not the case.
The U.S. implemented its version of the UNESCO Convention in 1983
when Congress enacted the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA). 4 1
As a part of the ratification process, the U.S. did two things. First, it declared
an understanding to the Convention: "The United States understands the
provisions of the Convention to be neither self-executing nor retroactive." 42
Second, it used the CPIA to define how the Convention applies within its
borders. When combined, these actions mean that nothing in the Convention
applies to the U.S. unless the CPIA has implemented it.
What does the CPIA implement? It implements three strategies for
curbing the illicit trade of antiquities. 43 First, in recognition of Article 9 of
the UNESCO Convention,44 § 2602 of the CPIA authorizes the President to
41 CUNO, supra note 14, at 36. The CPIA is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(2006).
42 UNESCO, Declarations and Reservations, Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property (2010), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URLID=13039&URLDO=DO TOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html#RESERVES.
43 See, e.g., Jowers, supra note 17, at 155.
44 Article 9 reads:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy
from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States
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place importation restrictions on specifically identified pieces of cultural
property at the request of States Parties to the UNESCO Convention when
the President determines that the requesting states' specifically identified
cultural property is in danger of pillage. 45 Second, § 2603 permits the
President, on his or her own initiative, "if [he or she] determines that an
emergency condition applies with respect to any archaeological or
ethnological material of any State Party,"'46 to wholly deny entrance into the
United States of any cultural property from a signatory State. The property
must be:
(!) a newly discovered type of material which is of importance for the
understanding of the history of mankind and is in jeopardy from pillage,
dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation; (2) identifiable as coming from
any site recognized to be of high cultural significance if such site is in
jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation which is, or
threatens to be, of crisis proportions; or (3) a part of the remains of a
particular culture or civilization, the record of which is in jeopardy from
pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation which is, or threatens to be,
of crisis proportions; and application of the import restrictions... would, in
whole or in part, reduce the incentive for such pillage, dismantling,
dispersal or fragmentation. 47
Finally, § 2607 allows the President to prevent any cultural property that
has been stolen from a signatory State's museum system or any of its
"religious or secular public monument[s]" from entering the U.S. 48 Though
this aligns with Article 7(b)(1) of the Convention, it fails to account for
Article 7(a) which declares that all signatory States will "take the necessary
measures ... to prevent museums and similar institutions within their
territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another State Party
Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these
circumstances, to participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to
carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and
imports and international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending
agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent
feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting
State.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.
45 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A) (2006).
46 Id. § 2603(b).
47 Id. § 2603(a)(1)-(3).
48 Id. § 2607; see also Jowers, supra note 17, at 155.
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which has been illegally exported after entry into force of this Convention, in
the States concerned. '49 Any property entering the U.S. that violates the
CPIA is subject to seizure, forfeiture, 50 and repatriation. 51
Despite the CPIA's grants of Presidential power, it ultimately fails to
implement the full purpose of the Convention: to make it completely illegal
for individuals and organizations to import objects that source nations claim
as their nontransferable cultural property. 52 As the CPIA attests, America's
commitment to the UNSECO Convention extends only to protecting cultural
property which (1) the President has declared in need of protection or (2) has
been stolen from foreign museums or monuments. Thus, unless cultural
property meets either of these exigencies under the CPIA, it can freely enter
the U.S. regardless of the legality of its origins in the eyes of source
nations.53 Therefore, under the CPIA, an American traveling to Peru can buy
a figurine recently excavated from an Incan village and bring it back to the
U.S. in contravention of Peruvian antiquities law unless the President has
made an agreement with Peru that limits the importation of exactly such an
artifact 54 or has determined on his own initiative that Incan antiquities merit
emergency protections.
Furthermore, because the CPIA is forward-looking, it does not apply to
any objects within the U.S. before its enactment. 55 Thus, any pieces of
cultural property that were in the U.S. before 1983 will remain where they sit
regardless of their provenance. Even though these realities grate against the
spirit of the Convention, because the Convention does not contain penalties
for non-compliance, the U.S. or any other signatory nation may ignore its
49 UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(a).
50 19 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (2006); see also Jowers, supra note 17, at 157.
51 19 U.S.C. §§ 2609(b)(1), (c)(2)(A) (2006); see also Jowers, supra note 17, at
157.
52 CUNO, supra note 14, at 43.
53 James A.R. Nafziger, Seizure and Forfeiture of Cultural Property by the United
States, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 27 (1998).
54 Fortunately for Peruvians, Peru and the U.S. entered into exactly such a bilateral
agreement in 1981. See generally Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, U.S.-Peru, Sept. 15, 1981, 33 U.S.T.
1608.
55 For examples of the limitations that the CPIA places on illegally imported cultural
property in the United States, see 19 U.S.C. § 2611 (2006).
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fundamental principles and implement only those provisions which it feels
obligated to apply. 56
The question then becomes, how can foreign states reach into the U.S. to
recapture pieces of their heritage which were illegally taken from them when
the CPIA and the Convention do not provide them with the necessary
recourse? The most effective means is through the use of the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA).57 Two United States court of appeals cases explain
how this is possible.
The first, United States v. McClain, dealt with a group of American
antiquities smugglers charged under (1) NSPA § 2314 with "conspiring to
transport and receiving through interstate commerce
certain ... artifacts.. . knowing these artifacts to have been stolen," 58 and
(2) NSPA § 2315 with "receiving, concealing, bartering, and selling" the
same. 59 The charges arose after the defendants took various pre-Columbian
artifacts out of Mexico and tried to sell them to the Mexican Cultural
Institute in San Antonio, Texas.60 Mexican officials at the Institute contacted
the FBI claiming that the artifacts were most likely stolen from Mexico
counter to a 1972 Mexican patrimony law which declares "all archaeological
objects [found] within [Mexico after 1972], movables and unmovables, to be
56 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, The Nation and the Object, in THINKING ABOUT THE
ELGIN MARBLES: CRrIcAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 158, 158
(2000).
57 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2323 (2006). For a brief
overview of the NSPA, see Nafziger, supra note 53, at 23.
58 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977). 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(2006) states:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or monies, of the value of $5,000 or more,
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.., shall be freed
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.
59 McClain, 545 F.2d at 992. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006) states:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any
goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more,
or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or
securities, of the value of $500 or more, which have crossed a State or United States
boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to
have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years or both.
60 McClain, 545 F.2d at 992-93. No one ever said smugglers were smart.
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the property of the Nation." 61 After the defendants admitted to an FBI secret
informer that they had taken the artifacts out of Mexico in contravention of
its 1972 law and they agreed to an alleged sale price of the artifacts for well
over the $5,000 NSPA threshold, the FBI arrested them.62
When a district court jury convicted the smugglers, they appealed to the
Fifth Circuit arguing that the NSPA did not apply to them because the
artifacts were not "stolen" according to the word's definition under the
NSPA. 63 They claimed that Mexico had no property rights over the artifacts
under the NSPA until they had physically possessed the artifacts-no matter
what Mexico had declared legislatively. 64 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.65 It
held that to satisfy the NSPA's definition of "stolen," the defendants needed
only to obtain "that which belongs rightfully to another and deprives that
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership." 66 The 1972 law granted all
property rights in any archaeological materials discovered in Mexico after
1972 to Mexico, regardless of whether or not the Mexican government knew
of their existence.67 Therefore, if the defendants had in fact removed the
artifacts from Mexico after 1972 (which they admitted they did), then they
would have violated the NSPA.68 The timing and existence of the law were
critical to the Fifth Circuit's analysis. It concluded: "We hold that a
declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of
an article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered
'stolen,' within the meaning of the [NSPA]." 69 In other words, the court held
that in order for a foreign nation to use the NSPA to recover cultural property
within the U.S., it must have passed a law granting it ownership over the
property in question.70
61 Id. at 991-92.
62 Id.
6 3 Id. at 994.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1000.
66 McClain, 545 F.2d at 995.
67 Id. at 1000.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 This concept was important in McClain where the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case back to the district court because the district court originally failed to
officially consider whether the artifacts in question had been discovered in Mexico before
1972. Id. at 1003. If they had been discovered before 1972, then Mexico's law did not
apply to the defendants and the NSPA could not reach them. Id.
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The second case is United States v. Schultz.7 1 This case dealt with an
American citizen charged with receiving "stolen Egyptian antiquities that had
been transported in interstate and foreign commerce" in violation of § 2315
of the NSPA. 72 Over the course of roughly five years, Schultz and a partner,
a British national by the name of Parry, conspired to smuggle various ancient
Egyptian works of art out of Egypt and into the U.S. 73 Their operation went
to formidable lengths to circumvent Egyptian and U.S. laws. First, the men
would identify an object they liked, such as a bust of Pharaoh Amenhotep
11174 or three limestone stelae,75 and coat it in plaster. This coating gave it the
appearance of a cheaply-made souvenir, and enabled Schultz and Parry to
smuggle it out of Egypt.76 Second, once they had removed something from
Egypt, they declared it a part of the "Thomas Alcock Collection," a fictitious
collection of art allegedly brought out of Egypt by one of Parry's relatives in
the 1920s, before Egypt made the export of such collections illegal. 77 After
U.S. authorities discovered Schultz's ruse, a jury found him guilty on the sole
count of the indictment. 78 Schultz appealed the finding, arguing that because
no one owned the antiquities he moved from Egypt, he could not be
convicted of receiving stolen property under the NSPA. 79
The Second Circuit rejected Schultz's argument. 80 Like Mexico, Egypt
had a cultural patrimony law which declared (1) that all antiquities
discovered after 1983 were property of the Egyptian government and (2) that
it was illegal, as of 1983, to trade in antiquities.8' Because this law clearly
vested ownership rights in Egypt over all artifacts discovered therein after
1983, and because Egypt proved that the artifacts which Schultz conspired to
receive were discovered after that date (the Egyptian police convinced the
Egyptian middlemen to give Schultz up), the court affirmed that Schultz had
71 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).
72 Id. at 395.
7 3 Id. at 396.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 398.
76 Id. at 396.
77 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
78 Id. at 398.
79 Id. at 396.
80 ld. at 410.
81 Id. at 399-400.
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violated § 2315 of the NSPA.82 In making this decision, the Second Circuit
relied heavily upon McClain.
83
These cases present us with a fundamental question. As asked by
William G. Pearlstein, a noted art law attorney:
Why would any foreign nation go to the time, effort, and expense of
applying for import restrictions under the [CPIA], which by definition must
always be ... subject to the satisfaction of strict statutory determinations,
when it can simply cultivate good working relationships with customs
agents and the Justice Department and obtain the protections of US criminal
laws and customs police at the expense of US taxpayers? 84
In other words, why bother with bilateral trade agreements limiting
American access to certain types of artifacts, when source nations can turn
American law against American traffickers of stolen property? This is an
excellent question given some of the recent successes that foreign nations
have had in using the NSPA (and the threat of the NSPA) to reach into the
U.S. to recover antiquities.85 However, it is important to note that the use of
82 Id. at 410.
83 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 403-04. The Second Circuit took its analysis one step further
than the Fifth Circuit did in McClain. One of Schultz's arguments was that the court had
no right to convict him of violating § 2315 of the NSPA when Congress had enacted a
measure-the CPIA-specifically designed to deal with all matters of cultural property
within the U.S. Id. at 408. The court disagreed, reasoning that Congress never intended
the CPIA to supplant any portion of the NSPA. Id. To support this assertion, the Second
Circuit cited two portions of the Senate report on the CPIA-S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 22
and 33. Both portions of the Senate report essentially said that the CPIA "affects neither
existing remedies available in state or federal courts nor laws prohibiting the theft and the
knowing receipt and transportation of stolen property in interstate and foreign
commerce." Id.
84 William G. Pearlstein, Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs:
The Decline and Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in WHO OWNS THE PAST? CULTURAL
POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 9, 19 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2007).
85 An example will illustrate this point. It deals with the famous Euphronios krater, a
2,500-year-old Greek vase that stands eighteen inches tall and twenty-one inches across.
WAXMAN, supra note 21, at 187. From 1972 to 2008, this krater-which displays two
masterfully painted red-figure scenes from Greek mythology-stood unmolested in the
Metropolitan Museum of Art as the best and most complete example of a work by the
Greco-Roman world's most renowned painter, Euphronios. Id. In 1995, Swiss police
raided the Geneva warehouse of Giacomo Medici, an antiquities dealer, and discovered
evidence that in 1971 Medici had purchased the krater from two Italian tomb raiders who
had broken into a previously undiscovered Roman tomb at the necropolis of Cerveteri
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the NSPA to cut off the illegal sale of antiquities to Americans might
ultimately amount to nothing more than the proverbial "finger in the dam."
First, there is no guarantee that an American court will accept the proof
that a source nation offers to validate its claims to allegedly looted cultural
property. For example, in the New York case of The Republic of Croatia v.
The Marquess of Northampton 1987 Settlement,86 Croatia and Hungary
attempted to argue that the Sevso Treasure--"a fourteen-piece collection of
fourth-century Roman silver and the copper cauldron in which the [silver] is
believed to have been stored in antiquity"-had been stolen from one of
them and sold to Lord Northampton shortly after it was illegally excavated.87
The jury refused to find that either party met its obligation to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Sevso Treasure had originated in its
lands.88 Both parties failed to meet this burden because neither had any direct
evidence or eyewitness testimony placing the Treasure's discovery within
their borders. 89 Instead they had to rely on questionable circumstantial
evidence like witnesses remembering seeing something that "looked like" the
treasure (though when pressed they remembered what they saw being smaller
than the Sevso Treasure), 90 alleged indentations in the ground made by the
Treasure's cauldron (which the court eventually learned had been made by a
wine cask),91 and the fact that because Rome once occupied Croatia and
Hungary, it only made sense that the Treasure must have come from one of
them.92 Matters were further complicated for Croatia and Hungary when the
and taken the krater. Randy Kennedy, Hugh Eakin & Elisabetta Povoledo, The Met,
Ending 30-Year Stance, Is Set to Yield Prized Vase to Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at
A6. Based on the records the Swiss collected from Medici's warehouse, the Italians
learned that he had sold the krater to an American antiquities dealer named Robert Hecht,
who lived and worked in Rome. WAXMAN, supra note 21, at 192. After raiding Hecht's
apartment, discovering a memoir detailing the krater's questionable history, and learning
that Hecht had sold the krater to the Met, the Italian Ministry of Culture asked the Met to
return the krater. Id. at 197. At first, the Met refused. Id. However, once Italy threatened
criminal proceedings under the NSPA, the Met agreed to return the krater, which it
considered to be one of its most prized possessions. Id.
86 See Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987
Settlement, 610 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), cert. denied, 84 N.Y.2d 805 (N.Y.
1994).
87 Kurzweil, Gagion & De Walden, supra note 28, at 83.
88 Marquess of Northampton, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 264-65.
89 See Kurzweil, Gagion & De Walden, supra note 28, at 87-91.
9 0 Id. at 88-89.
91 Id. at 87.
92 Id.
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trial court excluded their scientific evidence (soil samples taken from the
alleged Treasure find sites and from the cauldron itself) because it was
mishandled 93 and their expert testimony because it was too speculative. 94
This case highlights how it can be difficult for source nations to prove
that alleged pieces of their cultural property were stolen, especially when
they have only circumstantial evidence upon which they can rely. It also
highlights that repatriation litigation in the United States is time-consuming95
and scientifically and financially challenging for source nations who cannot
compete with American financial resources. Source nations have little choice
but to abandon the litigation-based pursuit of everything but the most
precious of their alleged cultural property when faced with (1) the resources
of wealthy American collectors and museums armed with expert opinions
and scientific data, (2) pressing domestic problems, and (3) marginal
UNESCO Convention protection.
B. Cultural Property Regulation in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has not ratified the UNESCO Convention.96 In its
place, the U.K. maintains a complicated import regulation system. Under § 1
of the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, the British
Board of Trade:
may by order make such provisions as [it thinks] expedient for
prohibiting or regulating, in all cases or any specified classes of
cases.., the importation into, or exportation from, the United Kingdom or
any specified part thereof.., of all goods or goods of any specified
description. 97
93 Id.
94 Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987 Settlement,
610 N.Y.S.2d 263, at 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
95 Kurzweil, Gagion & De Walden, supra note 28, at 92 (litigation lasted for three
years, with Hungary pressing its claims in the media for years afterwards).
96 States Parties to the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 16.
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Under this authorization, the British Board of Trade has ordered that all
goods entering Britain carry an import license. 98 Currently, the Department
of Trade and Industry Grants has declared "an Open General Import Licence
which permits the import of all goods from all sources unless specifically
excluded."9 9 Because no item of cultural property has been specifically
excluded by the Board or the Department of Trade and Industry Grants, all
cultural property may enter the U.K. unless either the Theft Act 1968 or the
Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 reaches it. 100
The Theft Act 1968 functions similarly to the U.S.'s NSPA. The Theft
Act makes it illegal for people in the U.K. to dishonestly handle goods (i.e.,
do anything other than turn them over to the police) that they either know or
should know are stolen, 10 1 regardless of where that theft took place and what
nation defines the theft as a theft. 10 2 On its face, this Act permits source
nations to reclaim looted cultural property exported to Britain. However,
there is a gaping hole in the Act: it applies only to stolen property handled
"for the benefit of another person."'1 3 This means that under the Theft Act
1968, unless the British police capture a piece of stolen cultural property
while it is still in the hands of middlemen, source nations have no legal right
to reacquire their cultural property from Britain. 104 Because this creates an
ethical dilemma, British Parliament passed the remedial Dealing in Cultural
Objects (Offences) Act 2003.105
The Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 reads that "[a]
person is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly deals in a cultural object that
is tainted, knowing or believing that the object is tainted."' 0 6 Under the Act, a
"cultural object" is "an object of historical, architectural or archaeological
interest." 107 An object is "tainted" if it was either excavated illegally or
removed from a building or structure of historic import of which it was a
structural part. 10 8 To be charged under the Act, a person has to acquire,
98 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 69.
99 Id.
100 Id.
1O Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 22(1) (Eng.).
102 Id. § 24(1).
103 Id. § 22(1).
104 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 70.
105 Id. at 71.
106 Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act, 2003, c. 27, § I(1) (Eng.).
10 7 Id. § 2(1).
108 Id. § 2(2).
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dispose of, import, or export a cultural object that the person knows or
believes is tainted. 109 It does not matter if the person knows that the object is
a cultural object." 10
Because both the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 and
the Theft Act 1968 apply to all stolen cultural objects regardless of their
origin, it appears that source nations should be able to pursue pieces of their
cultural property exported illegally to Britain.11' However, there are
significant problems with the U.K.'s system, even with the stopgap measures
employed by the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003. First, as in
the U.S., it is very difficult for a source nation to prove that an object was
taken from it. 112 The evidence is often insubstantial or circumstantial. Thus,
even if the British police capture a cultural object within the confines of
either Act, there is no guarantee that a source nation will be able to prove that
the object originated within its borders. Second, even though the Dealing in
Cultural Objects (Offenses) Act 2003 overcomes the Theft Act 1968's
application only to those parties handling stolen goods for the benefit of a
third-party by applying to any person who "deals in a cultural object," the
Act still requires that source nations prove that the alleged perpetrators (1)
actually knew that a cultural object was tainted when they dealt it and (2) that
they somehow dealt "dishonestly" with it.113 Neither of these is easy to
prove. Because of these difficulties, the Dealing in Cultural Objects
(Offenses) Act 2003 has been used so infrequently that scholars and British
officials now consider it largely symbolic. 114 Source nations therefore
possess little real hope of repatriating anything from the U.K. unless they can
clearly prove it was stolen from their territories counter to their patrimony
laws and was dealt with dishonestly.
C. Cultural Property Regulation in Japan
Japan accepted the UNESCO Convention in 2002.115 However, much
like the U.S., the law Japan enacted to accept the Convention largely strips it
109 1d. § 3.
10 Id. § 1(2).
111 Id. § 2(3).
112 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 81.
113 Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act, supra note 106, § 1(1).
114 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 71.
115 States Parties to the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 16.
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of any real obligations.1 6 Even though Japan's Law Concerning Control on
Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property permits States Parties to the
UNESCO Convention to designate whatever materials they want as their
own cultural property, "17 Japanese repatriation protections only extend to that
"cultural property [which] has been stolen from an institution stipulated in
Article 7(b)(1) of the Convention."1 18 Thus, unless a source nation can prove
that a piece of its cultural property which has ended up in Japan came from
one of its museums or some other "religious or public monument," the
Japanese will not repatriate it.119 This rule applies to an object even if a
source nation has eyewitness or scientific and expert testimony proving that
it was illegally excavated and sold from the source nation's borders.
Further complicating matters is the fact that Japan will not enforce its
limited version of the UNESCO Convention unless a source nation's
Minister of Foreign Affairs (or some governmental equivalent) contacts
Japan's Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology with
news of the theft before the stolen cultural property reaches Japan. 120 If this
116 See PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION
125 (2d ed. 2007).
117 Law Concerning Control on Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property, Law
No. 81 of 2002, art. 2(1), available at http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/law.html.
18 Law Concerning Control on Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property
(2002), art. 3(1). Article 7(b)(i) of the UNESCO Convention declares that States parties
will "prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum or a religious or
secular public monument or similar institution in another State Party to this
Convention... provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the
inventory of that institution." UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(b)(i). The
interplay of article 7(b)(i) of the UNESCO Convention and article 3(1) of the Japanese
Law Concerning Control on Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property presents an
interesting and unanswered question: will the Japanese law only apply to those objects at
a museum or public monument which have been "documented as appertaining to the
inventory of that institution"? O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 126.
119 O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 125.
120 Law Concerning Control on Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property
(2002), art. 5(1). It is important to note that the Japanese will not respect notifications
from any source nation that do not come from the source nation's government. O'KEEFE,
supra note 117, at 126. Thus, if a museum in Albania realizes that a thief has stolen a
Greek figurine from its collection, it cannot directly contact the Japanese government to
ask for its assistance. Id. Instead, it must ask the Albanian government to intercede on its
behalf. Id. This is problematic because museums of many source nations lack the data
infrastructure to account for all of their pieces. Id. Thus, it often takes them a great deal of
time to identify missing pieces--enough time for a piece to travel to Japan and find safe
harbor within its lenient cultural property regime. Id.
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notification occurs in a timely fashion, there is still no guarantee that the
Japanese will return the cultural property in question because the ultimate
decision on repatriation resides with two ministers in the Japanese
government.'2 ' If they decide that it is not in Japan's best interest to honor the
source nation's notification, nothing in Japanese law can compel Japan to do
so.
1 2 2 This situation, like that of the U.S. and U.K., makes it very difficult to
repatriate cultural property from Japan.
D. Cultural Property Regulation in Other Market States
The cultural property laws of two other States merit brief examination.
Switzerland ratified its version of the UNESCO Convention on January 3,
2004,123 when it enacted the Loi f6d6rale sur le transfert international des
biens culturels (CPTA) and the Ordonnance sur le transfert international des
bien culturels (OTBC). 124 According to Article 7 of the CPTA, the Swiss
Federal Council may enter into bilateral agreements with source nations in
order to protect "the cultural and foreign policy interests of Switzerland and
to ensure the protection of cultural heritage in general." 125 In order to achieve
a bilateral agreement with Switzerland concerning its cultural property, a
source nation must first convince Switzerland that the cultural property it
seeks to protect is "of significant importance to [its] heritage."' 126 Second, the
cultural property which the source nation wishes to subject to a bilateral
agreement must already "be subject to export control.., designed to protect
[the source nation's] cultural property."' 127 Finally, the source nation must be
willing to "agree to provide reciprocity" to Switzerland if any Swiss cultural
property were to ever illegally leave Swiss borders for the source nation. 128 If
Switzerland grants a source nation a bilateral agreement, it officially
121 These ministers are the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology and the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. Law Concerning Control
on Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property (2002), art. 3(3).
122 O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 126.
123 States Parties to the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 16.
124 O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 129. O'Keefe reproduced the CPTA in Appendix
VII on pages 204-11. The OTBC can be found online at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/444_1 1/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
125 O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 130.
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contracts to fine or imprison anyone who imports the materials covered by
the agreement and return whatever it confiscates. 129
If a source nation manages to acquire a bilateral agreement from the
Swiss, in order to invoke the protection of the agreement it must "prove that
[an] object was unlawfully imported into Switzerland and that it was of
significant importance to its own cultural heritage.' 30 These are two equally
tall and vague tasks that leave source nations at the mercy of Swiss judges
who are under no obligation to acknowledge any foreign state's definition of
its own cultural property. 131 Furthermore, if a source nation succeeds in
proving both of these requirements, it is nonetheless obligated to pay "all the
costs associated with protection, preservation, and return of an object," and,
if the object's Swiss purchaser bought it in good faith, purchaser
compensation.' 32 If a source nation cannot afford to cover these costs, the
Swiss will pay either 50 percent of the repatriation process's total costs or
50,000 francs. 133
The second state, Australia, has yet to ratify the UNESCO
Convention,1 34 although its Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act
(1986) (PMCHA) more closely aligns with the Convention's precepts than
any of the other market nation cultural property regimes addressed in this
note. 135 According to § 14(1) of the Act, "where (a) a protected object from a
foreign country has been exported from that country; (b) the export was
prohibited by law of that country relating to cultural property; and (c) the
object is imported [into Australia]; the object is liable to forfeiture."' 36 A
"protected object" is an object which forms "part of the movable cultural
heritage of a foreign country."' 137
Despite its encouraging language, the PMCHA ultimately fails to protect
source nations. Even though the Act grants wide powers of search, seizure,
129 Id.
130 Id. at 132
131 O'KEEFE, supra note 116, at 132.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 States Parties to the Convention of the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 16.
135 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 73-74. The Protection of Movable Cultural
Heritage Act (1986) can be found online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/
cth/consol-act/pomcha1986393/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) [hereinafter PMCHA].
136 PMCHA § 14(1).
137Id. § 3(1).
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and arrest to Australian police and customs agents, 138 it has been widely
observed that they lack the training and education necessary to identify
relevant pieces of cultural property.139 This is problematic, because it does
not appear that source nations have any legal recourse under Australian law
by which they may repatriate their illegally exported cultural property once it
passes through customs. 140
III. THE BENEFITS OF MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
In light of the failures of international cultural property regimes,
mediation is the best means by which states can equitably repatriate looted
antiquities, artwork, and other culturally significant objects.' 4 1 As Part II of
this note shows, market nation legal regimes do not accord source nations the
opportunity to fairly reclaim property discovered within and shipped from
their borders. 142 This part outlines how mediation can help source nations
fairly accomplish this task by (a) briefly defining mediation and (b)
comparing and contrasting it with other internationally recognized
mechanisms of dispute resolution. This part shows that mediation's traits, for
example, its production of mutually beneficial settlements without the
application of confusing market nation law, 143 uniquely position it to address
138 See id. §§ 27-36.
139 MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 74.
140 See PMCHA § 14(l).
141 See Hans Das, Claims for Looted Cultural Assets: Is There a Need for
Specialized Rules of Evidence?, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES:
PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SEVENTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 193, 194-
95 (Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct. of Arb. ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 2004).
142 The difficult position in which source nations find themselves in regard to
resources is no better exemplified than by the example of Turkey. ISABELLE FELLRATH
GAZZINI, CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN RESOLVING
NON-CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES 58 (2004). Gazzini points out the absurdity of Turkey
expecting to properly protect its cultural property interests in the courts of market nations
when its Department of Antiquities (the governmental department responsible for both
pursuing cultural property claims in foreign courts and the excavation and preservation of
Turkey's archaeological heritage) is granted a paltry $5 million a year to cover all of its
costs. Id.
143 See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 49 (2006).
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international cultural property disputes in a world where market nations hold
most of the power.
A. The Basic Elements of Mediation
Mediation is a process by which third parties-which could include
"private individuals, government officials, religious figures, regional or
international organizations, ad hoc groups, small states, [or] large
states" 144-facilitate peaceful negotiations between disputants who have
voluntarily agreed to meet and settle their differences in a consensual and
mutually beneficial manner. 145 It is a flexible process defined entirely by the
parties themselves in that it adapts to their individual needs and
circumstances 146 without necessitating the application of any procedural or
substantive law. 147 Thus, because formal rules do not constrain parties, they
may negotiate however they want to achieve whatever type of settlement
they like best, regardless of its creativity or subject matter. 148
144 Jacob Bercovitch, The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International
Relations, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1, 8 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992).
145 See id. at 7 (mediation is "a process of conflict management, related to but
distinct from the [disputants'] own efforts, where the disputing parties or their
representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group,
state, or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law"); Anna Spain, Using
International Dispute Resolution to Address the Compliance Question in International
Law, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 807, 826 (2009) (mediation is "a voluntary and non-coercive
process whereby an impartial third party helps states reach an agreement and repair
relations"); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 8 (1996) ("Mediation is an extension or elaboration of the
negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party who has
limited or no authoritative decision-making power. This person assists the principal
parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.").
146 Bercovitch, supra note 144, at 3-4.
147 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 62; see also Donald L. Carper & John B. LaRocco,
What Parties Might Be Giving Up and Gaining When Deciding Not to Litigate: A
Comparison of Litigation, Arbitration and Mediation, 63 DisP. RESOL. J. 48, 56-57
(2008).
148 See Norman Palmer, Litigation: The Best Remedy?, in RESOLUTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SEVENTH PCA
INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 265, 280 (Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct. of Arb. ed.,
Kluwer Law Int'l 2004). As Palmer puts it, mediators are not bound to advocate
traditional judicial remedies unless the parties so request. Id. at 270-71. Thus they can
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Mediation takes many forms. It can consist of (1) straight party-to-party
talks (i.e., bilateral or multilateral negotiations) where the mediator facilitates
discussion and clarifies party statements; 149 (2) shuttle negotiations in which
parties remain separated during negotiations and the mediator shuttles
communications, proposals, and draft settlement agreements between
them; 150 or (3) some combination of the two. The mediator's role can also
vary greatly in scope and degree. Even though mediator neutrality and
impartiality are fundamental to mediation, 151 disputants can agree to limit a
mediator's duties to everything from (a) passing notes between the parties
and refereeing negotiations to (b) interpreting party communications and
offering his or her own suggestions as to how to settle the parties' dispute, or
settle any misunderstandings that arise during negotiations. 152
The ultimate goal of mediation is to reach a mutually beneficial
agreement based upon an understanding of each party's interests. 153 The idea
is that parties (often referred to as stakeholders) base their claims on
underlying interests.15 4 For example, if a source nation enters into mediation
demanding that a market nation return a relatively common piece of ancient
pottery, it is most likely making its demand not because it actually wants the
piece of pottery back (it already has dozens of comparable pieces), but
because it feels that the market nation's refusal to turn over the piece has
encourage the disputants to find creative solutions to their problems. An example of such
creativity comes from a mediated dispute settlement involving the display of Jan Griffer
the Elder's View of Hampton Court Palace by the Tate Gallery in London. Id. at 273. The
painting ended up in the Tate's collection after the Nazis confiscated it from a Jewish
family in World War II and a disreputable dealer sold it to the Tate. Id. When the family
discovered it hanging in London, they demanded its return. Id. Entering into mediation,
the parties agreed that in exchange for the Tate continuing to display the painting, the
museum would (1) provide the family with a nominal ex gratia payment and (2) hang a
plaque next to the painting recognizing the suffering and cruelties visited upon victims of
the Holocaust. Id. This creative, mediated solution made both parties happy and saved the
Tate Gallery a public flogging for illegally possessing Holocaust art. Id.
149 MOORE, supra note 145, at 59, 343.
150 Michael L. Poirier Elliot, The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other
Consensus Building Practitioners, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 199, 228-29 (Lawrence Susskind,
Sarah McKeaman & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
151 Id. at 218.
152 Bercovitch, supra note 144, at 15; see also MOORE, supra note 145, at 99.
153 MOORE, supra note 145, at 71. According to Moore, "[i]nterests are specific
conditions (or gains) that a party must obtain for an acceptable settlement to occur." Id.
154 Id. at 71.
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violated its sovereignty, i.e., its ability to control its own property and
borders. Proponents of mediation suggest that it is only with an
understanding of such underlying interests that parties can negotiate to truly
and creatively resolve their differences. 155
To further clarify mediation and to prove why it is the best means by
which parties may settle their cultural property disputes, the next subsection
compares it with a few other internationally recognized dispute resolution
mechanisms.
B. Comparing Mediation with Negotiation, Arbitration, and
Litigation
Mediation is one of a number of internationally recognized dispute
resolution mechanisms. Others include negotiation, arbitration, and
litigation. 156 Negotiation is "direct communication [between parties] to
resolve an issue or dispute."'157 It requires nothing more than the presence of
the disputants or their representatives, a minimal number of mutually agreed-
upon procedural understandings that facilitate effective discussion, and an
interparty willingness to communicate. 158 Arbitration is a consent-based,
formal, litigation-like "process where parties submit decisionmaking
authority to [arbitrators] who make binding determinations about rights and
assets based on legal and factual merits of a dispute" in a non-litigation
155 Spain, supra note 145, at 836.
156 See, e.g., U.N. Charter, art. 33, para. 1, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf. According to the U.N. Charter, there are two other
internationally recognized dispute resolution mechanisms: inquiry and conciliation. Id.
Inquiry assumes that disputants need only a third party determination of a material,
contentious fact or set of facts to negotiate a settlement by themselves. O'CONNELL,
supra note 144, at 69. Conciliation is much like inquiry, except that instead of solely
settling the factual dispute, the third party doing the fact-finding drafts a non-binding
opinion offering its recommendation as to how the disputants might settle their
differences. Id. Unlike negotiation and mediation, two highly informal procedures,
inquiry and conciliation practitioners "conduct themselves quite like an arbitral tribunal,
hearing witness testimony, reviewing documents, and making... inspections" if
necessary. Id. This subsection does not comparatively assess inquiry and conciliation with
the other dispute resolution mechanisms mentioned because they are primarily concerned
with fact-finding to the exclusion of the underlying dispute. Thus, their relevance extends
only so far because parties will often use them merely as a means to augment negotiation.
157 O'CONNELL, supra note 143, at 25.
158Id.
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setting.159 Arbitration leaves every decision, other than the outcome, to the
parties-e.g., the identities of the arbitrators, the procedural and substantive
law governing the arbitration, and the location of the arbitration
proceedings. 160 Finally, litigation is "the act or process of carrying out a
lawsuit" before a court. 161 It is not consensual; one party can force it upon
another party. 162
The following subsections compare and contrast mediation with
negotiation, arbitration, and litigation in order to clarify why mediation is the
superior dispute resolution mechanism by which parties can pursue their
international cultural property claims. 163
1. Mediation Respects State Sovereignty
Mediation is uniquely positioned to respect state sovereignty. 164
Respecting state sovereignty in international cultural property disputes is
crucial because it is the lack of such respect in documents like the UNESCO
Convention that has forced market nations to enact cultural property regimes
159 Spain, supra note 145, at 828; see also Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full
Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative
Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1337, 1341 (2007) ("Arbitration is a
private, nongovernmental process, fashioned by contract, which provides for binding
resolution of a dispute through the decision of one or more private individuals selected by
the disputants.").
160 O'CONNELL, supra note 143, at 97; see also GAzzINI, supra note 142, at 100.
161 WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 790 (3d ed. 1991).
162 Palmer, supra note 148, at 279.
163 This subsection is not meant to perfectly log all the differences between
mediation and negotiation, arbitration, and litigation. Instead, it is designed to provide a
brief overview of the major differences which disputants will likely consider when
determining which mechanism they should use to pursue international cultural property
claims. It is also important to note that not every part of this subsection deals with
negotiation. This is the case because mediation is very similar to negotiation short of
mediation's use of a third party facilitator. Thus, because mediation and negotiation share
so many of the same benefits, this subsection deals only with negotiation when its
deficiencies render it inferior to mediation. Finally, this subsection discusses litigation
because even though Part II makes a strong implied argument against using litigation to
resolve cultural property disputes, some parties might hope that the international
community will someday build new, more equitable, litigation-based cultural property
regimes by which they can reacquire looted objects. This part partially exists to suggest
that this would be a mistake for numerous reasons relating to litigation's deficiencies.
164 Palmer, supra note 148, at 280; Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 52.
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which strip source nations of their ability to equitably pursue looted cultural
property. 165 Market nations like the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Switzerland, and
Australia dislike the UNESCO Convention because it attempts (1) to place
the decision as to what constitutes illegally acquired cultural property into
source nation hands166 and (2) to force market nations to return objects that
enter their borders that source nations have labeled their cultural property
almost without question. 167 If these two allegations are true, then the
UNESCO Convention might actually violate market nation sovereignty by
allowing source nations to freely reach into market nations' borders and
repatriate whatever they wish.
Mediation addresses this fear in ways that negotiation, arbitration, and
litigation cannot. Because mediation does not require the application of any
particular substantive law (such as the UNESCO Convention) unless the
parties agree, market nations can begin mediation with the understanding that
no law will force them to do anything to which they do not agree. 168 This is
quite different than arbitration or litigation because these mechanisms must
apply to some type of binding substantive law.169 Even though negotiation
does not require the application of any substantive law, it too falls short of
mediation's potential effectiveness because it has no third party to facilitate
165 See Bercovitch, supra note 144, at 2; see also GAzzINI, supra note 142, at 56
(discussing that states readily invoke "sovereign immunity" when sued in domestic
courts).
166 UNESCO Convention, supra note 12, art. 13(d) (States Parties to the Convention
undertake to "recognize the indefeasible right of each State Party to this Convention to
classify and declare certain cultural property as inalienable which should therefore ipso
facto not be exported, and to facilitate recovery of such property by the State concerned
in cases where it has been exported.").
167 Id. at art. 13(b) (States Parties to the Convention undertake to "ensure that their
competent services cooperate in facilitating the earliest possible restitution of illicitly
exported cultural property to its rightful owner.").
168 See Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 57.
169 See Palmer, supra note 148, at 279-80. It is important to note that arbitration,
unlike litigation, allows disputant-stakeholders to mutually agree on what substantive law
will apply to the resolution of their dispute. Id. at 279. However, unlike mediation in
which parties negotiate a mutually beneficial settlement to their dispute, arbitration
almost always has a winner and a loser according to the substantive law invoked by the
parties and interpreted by the arbitration panel. Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming
Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1251, 1258-59 (2008).
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talks. Therefore, negotiation is much more likely to dissolve when one party
refuses to bend. 170
2. Mediation Requires Mutual Consent
Because mediation is a consensual process with built-in compliance
measures that do not infringe upon perceptions of state sovereignty, it
encourages parties in international cultural property disputes to directly settle
with each other and comply with any agreement at which they arrive better
than negotiation, arbitration, or litigation.171 Mediation is consensual in two
ways: (1) disputants voluntarily enter into mediation and (2) in order for a
settlement to bind, disputants must voluntarily agree to mutual
enforcement. 172 This consensual nature encourages nations to respect state
sovereignty by leaving dispute resolution entirely up to the goodwill of the
parties themselves. 173 Furthermore, because parties design their own
settlements, the likelihood of compliance is relatively high; when parties
negotiate in good faith, any mediated agreement should address the interests
of both parties. 174
Arbitration and litigation cannot make similar claims. Even though
arbitration and mediation both require each party's consent to begin, there is
no guarantee that an arbitrated outcome will please all the disputants because
arbitration's results are binding and determined independently by a third
party. 175 When an arbitrated result does not please one of the disputants, it is
incredibly difficult and costly to force them to comply with an arbitration
award,176 unless the disputants ratified some arbitration enforcement treaty
170 See MOORE, supra note 145, at 16-18.
171 See Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 50. According to Gazzini, "[P]rivate
ordering obtained through. .. mediation focuses on the identification of the parties'
respective interests, and the accommodation and conciliation of their respective claims
through a mutually agreeable solution. There is no constraint of a strict application of the
law following an adversarial procedure ... nor is there any requirement to respect the
coherency of a particular case law. [This in turn inspires] a high rate of spontaneous
compliance." GAZZlNI, supra note 142, at 62 (emphasis added).
172 Spain, supra note 145, at 826.
173 See Bercovitch, supra note 144, at 23.
174 MOORE, supra note 145, at 72-73.
175 Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 54.
176 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 87. This is true even though pacta sunta servanda
renders an arbitral award an internationally binding contract. Id. When parties agree to
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such as the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitrary Awards (New York Convention). 177
Litigation also suffers from serious deficiencies, the most obvious of
which is its mandatory nature. Unlike other dispute resolution mechanisms, if
a court has jurisdiction over one party's claim, that party can force a
defendant into court where judges applying that court's substantive and
procedural law will resolve the claim and apply traditional, non-interest
based relief like damages or injunctions. 178 While litigation offers finality
and a relatively easy means for the enforcement of judgments, its non-
consensual nature destroys party relationships and undermines creative
problem-solving that could ultimately lead to future resolutions and mutually
benefit all of the parties involved.179
While negotiation only proceeds with party consent, its narrowness limits
its usefulness in cultural property disputes. Unlike mediation, where the
mediator is usually a person or party with enough international clout or
interparty standing to personally monitor and encourage the enforcement of
any settlements reached, 180 negotiation relies entirely upon the goodwill of
the parties for enforcement. Since negotiation has absolutely no compliance
mechanisms in place, settlements negotiated without a mediator are
extremely susceptible to renunciation.
3. Mediation Identifies Party Interests and Shapes Settlements
Accordingly
Unlike negotiation, arbitration, and litigation, mediation empowers
parties to look beyond their original claims to the interests that underlie
them.'18 As mentioned above, mediation asks disputants to identify their real
motivations and to cooperate to come to mutually beneficial agreements
enter into arbitration, they usually contract to abide by the decision of the arbitral
tribunal. Id. at 29-30.
177 Id. at 79. According to the New York Convention, a state that ratifies the
Convention "must recognize and enforce arbitral awards entered in" other states unless it
has given international notice that it will only enforce awards granted by tribunals seated
or convened in other ratifying states. Stromberg, supra note 159, at 1344.
178 Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 53-54; Palmer, supra note 148, at 268.
179 Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 53-54.
180 Bercovitch, supra note 144, at 9.
181 Spain, supra note 145, at 836.
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which address each disputant-stakeholder's most critical interests. 182 This
practice is the essence of consensus-building.183
Negotiation fails to accomplish consensus building because, without the
presence of a mediator, disputants have little impetus to discuss their
interests in an honest and cooperative manner. Instead, it is likely that they
will rely on whatever sources of coercive power they have to attempt to
accomplish what they want.184 In the international cultural property world,
this sometimes leads to a market nation forcing a source nation to take it to
the market nation's courts where the resource-poor source country will have
the almost impossible burden of proving that the object in question was
stolen.
Arbitration also often fails to build consensus because, while it is a
consensual process in which the disputants have chosen the law that the
arbitrators will apply to their dispute, the ultimate resolution is left in the
hands of the arbitrators. 185 They can fashion their resolution however they
wish within the bounds of their grants of power, ignoring or integrating as
many of the disputants' interests as they want. Thus, there is no guarantee
that an arbitrated decision will actually please each disputant.
Finally, litigation also fails to build consensus because litigation is an
adversarial process. 186 Parties argue against each other over either the
interpretation of facts or the applicability of a set of laws. There is often little
room for negotiation and no room for a creative settlement or considerations
of future relationships. One party wins and takes home the spoils, and the
other loses and gets nothing.
182 MOORE, supra note 145, at 72-73.
183 Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert's Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in THE
CONsENsUs BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT
3, 6 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
According to Susskind, consensus-building is "a process of seeking unanimous
agreement. It involves a good-faith effort to meet the interests of all stakeholders.
Consensus has been reached when everyone agrees they can live with whatever is
proposed after every effort has been made to meet the interests of all stakeholding
parties." Id.
184 Spain, supra note 145, at 814.
185 O'CONNELL, supra note 143, at 97.
186 See GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 62.
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4. Mediation Maintains Workable Disputant Relationships
As just mentioned, unlike highly contentious mechanisms such as
litigation, and somewhat contentious mechanisms like arbitration, mediation
facilitates positive future interactions between parties.187 Because mediation
is non-adversarial and encourages creative problem solving, parties can come
to agreements which cooperatively preserve their relationships and lay the
groundwork for the resolution of future disputes. 188 One such creative
solution to cultural property disputes is the use of partage. 189 Partage is the
process whereby source nations permit market nation archaeologists to
excavate source nation archaeological sites and share their finds with source
nation museums in exchange for the right to keep a portion of what they find
for museums and private collectors in their home countries. 190 This type of
solution-which a mediator might be able to suggest to two nations fighting
over the dissemination of a source nation's cultural property-not only helps
source nations locate and excavate their heritage, but it enacts a system by
which the parties may exchange cultural property in the future. 191 While it is
possible for non-third party negotiations to come up with this type of
solution, the presence of a mediator can increase the likelihood of such a
solution occurring. The characteristics of arbitration and litigation preclude
this type of creativity.
5. Mediation Promotes Interparty Cultural, Political, Religious,
and Social Understanding
Mediation facilitates cross-party understanding better than any other
form of dispute resolution. Because parties to a mediated dispute may freely
choose whomever they want to conduct their mediation, they can select a
third party who understands the cultural, political, religious, or social
differences that limit their ability to effectively communicate, and therefore
187 Stromberg, supra note 159, at 1398.
188 Lawrence Susskind & Eileen Babbitt, Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective
Mediation of International Disputes, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 30, 31 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey
Z. Rubin eds., 1992).
189 CUNO, supra note 14, at xxiii, 14.
190 Id.
191 See id.
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negotiate, by themselves. 192 This is particularly important in the cultural
property world where disputant-stakeholders almost always come from
different nations. Unless someone with cross-cultural understanding leads
discussions, it is unlikely that parties with radically different expectations
and cultural norms will ever permanently settle their disputes by
themselves. 193
Although parties engaged in arbitration can appoint a tribunal that
understands their differences, arbitration is not as concerned as mediation
with consensus, and therefore the arbitrators' knowledge of interparty
differences only comes into play when they must apply substantive law to
facts. 194 The same is true with litigation. Courts are under no obligation to
take into account cultural, political, religious, or social differences which
may directly affect party perceptions of what constitutes equitable judicial
relief.195
A hypothetical will illustrate this point. Imagine that Greece sues a
British museum in a British court under the Dealing in Cultural Objects
(Offenses) Act 2003 for the repatriation of a 3,000-year-old marble statue
carved by ancient Athens' most renowned sculptor, Praxiteles. 196 The statue
ended up in the museum's collection after the museum purchased it in good
faith from a dealer who looted it from an unexcavated temple in Attica. At
trial, Greece presents evidence that, because the statue was one of two
remaining original works by Praxiteles, 197 it bears special significance to the
192 Spain, supra note 145, at 838. An example of such a situation occurs when U.S.
and Central American parties mediate disputes. Peters, supra note 169, at 1277. Whereas
people from the U.S. prefer direct, person-to-person communications, Central Americans
prefer indirect, group communications. Id. A mediator can help parties overcome these
differences in culturally sensitive ways that facilitate negotiations without cultural
incident. Id.
193 Rebecca Golbert, An Anthropologist's Approach to Mediation, 11 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 81, 95 (2009). There is another benefit to parties being able to appoint
the mediator intervening in the dispute. Unlike in litigation, in which parties must accept
whatever judge they get, mediation permits disputants to select experts in international
cultural property disputes, international relations, or the objects over which the parties
wrangle. Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147, at 53.
194 See Palmer, supra note 148, at 279.
195 Id.
196 For a brief background about Praxiteles, see Praxiteles in Encyclopedia
Britannica On-Line, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/474116/Praxiteles (last
visited Aug. 24, 2010).
197 The other, non-invented work being "Hermes Carrying the Infant Dionysus." Id.
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Greek people and should be returned to Attica, Praxiteles' home.' 98 Despite
this evidence, the court rules that because the museum did not purchase the
statue with knowledge that it was stolen, it is under no obligation to return
it.199 While this ruling follows British law, it completely ignores the
underlying cultural and political interests that Greece has in the Praxiteles
sculpture, interests that a mediator could have identified and integrated into
negotiations in a creative manner. Now, because of the court's ruling, it is
likely that Greece will never again wish to cooperate with a British museum
for fear of losing more of its cultural property.
6. Mediation Circumvents the Complicated Traits of Arbitration
and Litigation
Mediation allows parties to avoid the complicated legal issues associated
with arbitration and litigation. Many source nations struggle to navigate the
world's innumerable cultural property laws.200 For example, if a source
nation wishes to bring suit to recover a piece of its cultural property in the
U.S., it must be prepared to contend with fifty different sets of state
substantive and procedural laws, an overlaying federal law system, local
court rules, and the unique application and interpretation of all these rules
and laws by each judge before whom the case may appear.20 1 Further
complicating matters is that few cultural property regimes take root in
uniform legal traditions.202 This means, as the hypothetical about Praxiteles
alluded to, that nations with civil law traditions, like France, will permit a
good faith purchaser of stolen cultural property to keep the objects he or she
purchases, while nations with common law traditions, like the United States,
will not.203
198 Id.
199 Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offenses) Act, supra note 106, § 1(1).
200 See Peters, supra note 169, at 1256.
201 Id.
202 See Marc-Andr6 Renold, Stolen Art: The Ubiquitous Question of Good Faith, in
RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SEVENTH
PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 251, 252 (Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct. of Arb.
ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 2004).
203 Id.
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A problem in litigation that faces both source and market nations is that
it sometimes "miscarries." 204 This means that if there is a hung jury, a
mistrial, or if a judge makes some type of appealable procedural error, it is
likely that the initial suit brought by a source nation will not settle the
dispute.20 5 A problem unique to market nations in litigation is that if a source
nation wishes to sue a market nation, there are few rules which will preclude
it from either (1) suing simultaneously in both its courts and the courts of the
market nation it alleges illegally possesses its cultural property, or (2) filing
suit in its own courts if its first suit filed elsewhere fails to achieve its
goals.206
Arbitration and litigation also suffer from the fact that it is difficult for
source nations to prove that the bodies with which they file their claims have
jurisdiction.20 7 Thus, regardless of the legitimacy of a source nation's claim
against a market nation, unless (1) the market nation agrees to submit to
arbitration or (2) a tribunal or court holds that it has jurisdiction over the
claim, there is no guarantee that the source nation will be able to get a
binding judgment. Furthermore, arbitration and litigation focus on
"backward-looking facts, evidence, and arguments asserting and defending
legal rights rather than on present and future development of
beneficial ... solutions. '20 8 Consequently, instead of using a dispute as an
opportunity to better forge future relations between the parties as mediation
does, arbitration and litigation attempt only to redress past harms, with
minimal concern for the future implications of awards and holdings.209
Mediation overcomes all of these problems because it can set aside
concerns about which law governs a dispute, which body has jurisdiction
204 Palmer, supra note 148, at 272.
205 Id.
206 See Stromberg, supra note 159, at 1340-41.
207 See GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 51.
208 Peters, supra note 169, at 1259. This problem is particularly lethal in cultural
property disputes because, as mentioned in Part II, source nations rarely have concrete,
physical evidence that a piece of cultural property comes from within its borders. Das,
supra note 141, at 205. Mediation overcomes arbitration and litigation's reliance on such
proof because it does not require parties to present "clear and convincing proof' of
ownership. Id. at 209. Instead, it merely requires that the parties negotiate with whatever
evidence they have to achieve the most equitable outcome in light of each disputant-
stakeholder's interests. Thus, circumstantial evidence that is not usually given great
weight in arbitration or litigation can have greater value in mediation.
209 See supra, Part II.B.4.
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over a claim, and what types of evidence are admissible. 210 In mediation, all
that matters is the parties' interests and their ability to forge a mutually
beneficial agreement. 211
7. Mediation Is Confidential and Saves Disputants Time and
Money
Mediation is superior to litigation because it is confidential, 212 and is
superior to both arbitration and litigation because it is cheaper and less time-
consuming.213 Mediation is confidential (as is arbitration); before mediation
begins, disputants can agree to make the proceedings and the result
completely private.2 14 Market nations prefer confidentiality because they do
not want to publicly argue over whether their museums and collectors have
knowingly purchased stolen goods while they themselves have turned a blind
eye.215 Litigation forces this discussion out into the public where the media
and source nation activists can turn public sentiment against market nations
and force them to repatriate things that they might not have had to
otherwise. 216
The time and monetary costs of arbitration and litigation also encourage
parties to cultural property disputes to pursue mediated resolutions. Like
litigation, arbitration can carry on for a great deal of time depending on how
complicated the issues are.2 17 It can also require many of the same expensive
activities as litigation: drafting and submitting intricate briefs, conducting
discovery, making oral arguments, deposing and examining witnesses, and
traveling to foreign jurisdictions.218 Each of these activities, whether they
take place in arbitration or litigation, can be prohibitively expensive, and that
is even before considering the costs of an appeal.219 Because disputants, even
those market nations with deep pockets, do not want to waste money
210 O'CONNELL, supra note 143, at 59.
211 Id. at 72-73.
212 Palmer, supra note 148, at 272.
213 Das, supra note 141, at 198.
214 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 67.
215 Id. at 77-78.
216 See id.
2 17 Das, supra note 141, at 198.
218 See Stromberg, supra note 159, at 1385-86; Carper & LaRocco, supra note 147,
at 50.
219 Das, supra note 141, at 198.
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pursuing drawn out claims with no guarantee of success, mediation offers
them an attractive option to settling claims that is generally cheaper and less
time-consuming. 220
IV. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
By now it is clear that mediation, more than any other dispute resolution
mechanism, can provide parties to international cultural property disputes
with a means by which they can quietly, cheaply, creatively, and equitably
settle claims relating to culturally significant objects. However, in order to
fully understand mediation's potential, it is necessary to examine the interests
that are at stake in international cultural property disputes. The first
subsection below does this. The second subsection takes this analysis a step
further by suggesting what types of mediated solutions are available to
parties who are willing to engage in mediation. This section exists, therefore,
to provide disputant-stakeholders with tangible ideas for facilitating the
equitable exchange of cultural property in the future.
A. Stakeholder Interests in International Cultural Property Disputes
There are two sets of stakeholders in the debate over the exchange of
cultural property. One set, led by market nations, preaches the liberal trade of
221
cultural property. It argues for a world in which museums and private
collectors can buy what they want, when they want.222 The other, led by
source nations, seeks the retention of cultural property by the states in which
220 See GAzzlNI, supra note 142, at 59. The importance of the public nature and the
costs of litigation cannot be stressed enough. In 2006, for example, the J. Paul Getty
Museum in Los Angeles, California finally agreed to return over forty artifacts to Italy
that Italy had long argued were looted. Elisabetta Povoledo, Getty Agrees to Return 40
Antiquities to Italy, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 2, 2007, at E 1. The Getty only agreed to do so after
Italy proved that it was willing to take the Getty to court under the NSPA (by 2007 Italy
had already sued a Getty curator and an affiliated antiquities dealer under the NSPA) and
drag its name through the mud in the press accusing it of knowingly purchasing stolen
property. Id.
221 See supra Part II.
222 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 5 (Market nations resist "any principle that would
imperil their vast public and private collections or would otherwise unnecessarily hamper
the cultural property lucrative market.").
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it is found.223 In order for these stakeholders to successfully mediate their
international cultural property disputes, they need to understand why the
other believes and argues what it does. It is only by understanding the
interests that are at stake in a cultural property dispute that parties will ever
be able to forge the relationships necessary to assure a continued exchange of
cultural property. This subsection examines these interests in the hopes that
with improved cross-party understanding, enlightened stakeholders will more
readily mediate their disputes.
1. Source Nation, Archaeologist, and Local Museum Interests
The meta-interest that source nations, archaeologists, and museums
native to source nations (i.e., local museums) share is a source nation's
retention of the cultural property found within its borders. 224 This interest is
so important that it has inspired a global system of near total embargoes on
the international trade of cultural property.225 In order to understand why
source nations, archaeologists, and local museums use this meta-interest to
justify retentionist cultural patrimony laws, it is necessary to understand the
underlying interests.
The first underlying interest is the belief that unless source nations pass
retentionist laws, looting will strip them of their ability to study their cultural
property to better understand their histories and identities.226 Source nations
argue that unless they embargo the export of all known objects of cultural
223 Id. at 5 ("Art-rich nations (or source States), eager to obtain restitution of the
numerous pieces removed from their territory and to affirm their complete control over
their cultural patrimony, [defend] the principle of unconditional and uncompensated
return of all cultural property transferred without proper authori[z]ation from the State of
origin.").
224 BATOR, supra note 30, at 37.
225 For examples of such laws, see the cultural patrimony laws of Egypt and Mexico
referenced above in Part II.A's discussion of United States v. Schultz and United States v.
McClain. Thailand provides another example. It has two laws on the topic-the Act of
Ancient Monuments, Antiquities, Objects of Art and National Museums, B.E. 2504
(1961), and the Act on National Monuments, Antiques, Objects of Art and National
Museums (No. 2), B.E. 2535 (1992). These laws combine to place the ownership of all
movable man-made or naturally-occurring objects "buried in, concealed or abandoned
within" Thailand which "[are] useful in the field of art, history, or archaeology" in the
hands of the Thai government. MACKENZIE, supra note 35, at 63. These Acts also declare
that none of these objects can be exported without a license from the government-
something that rarely happens. Id. at 66.
226 BATOR, supra note 30, at 27.
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importance (including objects which have been legally excavated), so much
of their history will leave their borders that their people, historians, and
archaeologists will have nothing left to study.227 This interest expresses that
objects found within a source nation are "both a manifestation and a mirror
of its culture. '228 In other words, objects found within a source nation
represent an earlier expression of that source nation, one that informs who it
and its people are today. 229 At its root, this interest asserts that it is only
through the local study of the objects found within source nations that source
nations will ever be able to understand their identities; their "cultural,
spiritual, even racial descent from the ancient peoples who made" them.230
It is important to note at this point why source nations believe that
retentionist cultural patrimony laws will stop looting. They believe that if
source nations make it illegal to export their cultural property, no market
nation, market nation museum (i.e., universal museum), or foreign private
collector will want to buy a cultural object without the clearest of legal
provenance lest they have to repatriate it at great personal expense. 231 Thus,
by making it difficult to acquire cultural property of questionable origin,
source nations will decrease demand for looted objects, and undermine the
practice.232 Market nations, universal museums, and private collectors,
however, are quick to point out that retentionist cultural patrimony laws have
the opposite effect.233 By making it difficult to possess any cultural property
other than that which source nations have pre-approved (a rare occurrence
under current cultural patrimony laws), source nations force market nations,
universal museums, and private collectors to secretly and fraudulently revert
227 John Henry Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, in
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART,
AND LAW 244-45 (John Henry Merryman ed., 2009).
228 BATOR, supra note 30, at 28.
229 Id.
230 CUNO, supra note 14, at xxxii.
231 See BATOR, supra note 30, at 35-39; see also CUNO, supra note 14, at 127.
Market nations refer to their museums as "universal museums" because they allegedly
function like physical encyclopedias that allow people to come to compare and contrast
objects from every corner of the earth and from all parts of human history. Id. at xxxi-
xxxii. Universal museums are meant to emphasize that the "world's artistic and cultural
legacy [is] common to us all." Id. at xxxii.
232 Merryman, supra note 227, at 275.
233 Hughes, supra note 2, at 132.
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to the black market to purchase foreign antiquities, art, and culturally
significant objects.234
The second underlying interest is that, unless source nations impose
retentionist cultural patrimony laws, archaeologists will lose their chance to
draw all the knowledge they can from cultural property. 235 The argument
behind this interest states that when a looter rips an object from its
archaeological context and sells it abroad, archaeologists can no longer
interpret the object within the historical context of the find site. 236 Thus,
source nations allege that in order to fully understand their history, they must
use all legal means necessary to preserve the archaeological integrity of their
cultural property. 237 Their self-knowledge depends on it.
The third underlying interest is that unless source nations enact
retentionist cultural property laws, they will lose the ability to profit from
their history.238 Source nations, archaeologists, and local museums believe
that when local museums or archaeological sites display a source nation's
cultural property, those museums or sites attract foreign tourists. 239 This not
only increases international awareness of source nation history via local
means, but it also increases source nation income.240 For example, the Valley
of the Kings in Egypt, the tomb of Qin Shihuangdi and his terra cotta
warriors in China, and the city of Pompeii in Italy, as well as the museums
which accompany them, generate large amounts of tourist revenue, revenue
which Egypt, China, and Italy might not otherwise be able to produce.241
The fourth underlying interest is the most instinctual: it is wrong for a
market nation to claim possession over objects found in the earth of another
nation and produced by people from whom it did not descend.242
Nationalistic to the core and profoundly simple, this interest suggests that if a
234 BATOR, supra note 30, at 41-42. Scholars also point out that in a world filled
with poverty, starvation, and war, the only way to truly stop looting is to provide the
looters with alternative means of making money to support their families. CUNO, supra
note 14, at xxxiii. Though this is controversial, it may be inevitable that in the debate over
the transmission of cultural property both sides will have to acknowledge the interests of
the looters themselves.
235 See Merryman, supra note 227, at 254-55.
236 Id.
237 CUNO, supra note 14, at 155.




242 CUNO, supra note 14, at xxxii, 9.
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source nation owns all the dirt within its borders-dirt it inherited from its
ancestors-it owns everything found in that dirt as well.243 Modem notions
of state sovereignty demand no less. 244
2. Market Nation, Universal Museum, and Private Collector
Interests
Market nations, universal museums, and private collectors argue for the
liberal international trade of cultural property.245 These stakeholders put forth
many reasons to support their position. The first is that the liberal trade of
cultural property undermines ignorance, spreads cultural sensitivity, and
promotes knowledge. 246 Because cultural property represents source nations,
if the world is to ever fully understand all of its peoples, then objects which
capture the essences of source nations must globally proliferate. 247 Second,
the preservation of the world's collective past demands the liberal trade of
cultural property. Source nations lack the financial, institutional, and
scholarly resources to identify and preserve all of their archaeological
resources.248 Thus, if the world's cultural property is to be safe, it must be
exported to market nations where universal museums and private collectors
with adequate resources can properly preserve important historical objects
for future generations.249 Finally, and most philosophically, the liberal
international trade of cultural property promotes the belief that the entire
world owns cultural property-not just the nations in which it is found.250
Because so many modern nations and people share common ancestral and
cultural origins, no single nation may lay claim to any particular ancient
culture. 251 Therefore, every person around the world deserves to have access
to objects from every other part of the world. If they cannot have such access,
as is the chief side effect of retentionist cultural patrimony laws, market
243 See generally id. at 9.
244 ld.
245 BATOR, supra note 30, at 30-32.
246 Id. at 32.
247 Id. at 31-32. According to Bator, art is a "good ambassador." Id. at 30. "It
stimulates interest in, understanding of, and sympathy and admiration for [the exporting]
country." Id.
248 MERRYMAN, supra note 56, at 208.
249 See BATOR, supra note 30, at 21.
250 CuNo, supra note 14, at 20.
251 Id.
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nations, universal museums, and private collectors argue that they will never
be able to understand their common cultural and historical identities.2
52
To better understand these interests and how they relate to those of
source nations, archaeologists, and local museums, it might be helpful to
outline the counter-arguments that market nations, universal museums, and
private collectors pose. First, as alluded to above, market nations, universal
museums, and private collectors argue that source nations have no right to
claim that the antiquities found within their borders actually inform who
they, and they alone, are. 253 In many cases, modem nations share little in
common with the ancient civilizations buried within their borders.254 Take
Egypt for example. Besides potentially being genetically different from the
ancient Egyptians, modem Egyptians practice a different religion, eat
different foods, and utilize a completely different form of government than
their geographic predecessors. 255 Market nations, universal museums, and
private collectors are also quick to point out that in many cases the ancient
civilizations over which source nations claim possession span many different
modem countries. Thus, for example, how is it that Italy can claim sole
possession of Roman artifacts when Rome also conquered portions of other
modem nations, such as France, Greece, Germany, Morocco, Libya, and
Israel? 256
Along these same lines, market nations, universal museums, and private
collectors also ask how it is that source nations can claim possession over
252 Id. It should be mentioned that private collectors share many of the same
interests as market nations and universal museums because they also appreciate cultural
property's ability to inspire, inform, and subvert racial, cultural, and geographic
insensitivity. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHiCs, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 961
(John Henry Merryman et al. eds., 2007). For many collectors, collecting is a means by
which they can (1) trace a particular artistic or cultural idea through history, (2) pay
homage to an individual artist or period, and (3) tangibly connect to the past. Id Besides
being personally edifying, collectors often collect in order to invest in property which
does not quickly lose its value. Id. at 964. Furthermore, some collectors collect with the
specific intention of leaving their collections to museums. Id. Scholars argue that it is
through the gifting of private collections to museums that universal museums maintain
their diverse holdings. Id. Because the tastes of collectors often differ from those of
nearby museum curators, when a private collector contributes his collection to a nearby
museum, he or she instantly adds to it works which the public might not have otherwise
been able to see. Id.
253 CUNO, supra note 14, at 9-10.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See generally id. at 11.
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objects whose creators were influenced by cultures which source nations
argue "belong" to other modem nations. 57 Take Italy and ancient Italian
works, for example:
Are they Italian because they derive from cultures said to have developed
autonomously in the region of present-day Italy? Or have we simply chosen
to identify them that way? They look like things we know to have been
made by ancient peoples in the region of what is now, some nearly two
thousand years later, Italy. Of course, they also look like things made in
Greece, which in turn look like things made in Egypt, which themselves
bear a resemblance to things made in the Ancient Near East. And then too,
we see resemblances to things made more or less at the same time in Persia,
the Steppes of Russia, and central Asia, not to mention across the Levant
and northern Africa and up into Europe by way of the Balkans. And of
course, too, each of these influences comprises currents of others, such that
we can trace the 'identity' of 'Italian' works of art through a series of
artistic and cultural encounters over much of the known world and over
hundreds and hundreds of years.258
Second, while objects lose a portion of their archaeological, historical,
and scientific value when someone removes them from their archaeological
context, source nations, universal museums, and private collectors argue that
they do not lose nearly as much as source nations allege.259 In fact, because
of their training, scholars can readily glean meaningful aesthetic,
technological, iconographic, and epigraphic information from any culturally
significant object, even a looted object.260
Third, even if source nations could generate a profit off of archaeological
sites and their fruits, market nations, universal museums, and private
collectors argue that they will never have enough resources to protect all of
their archaeological sites and display all of the cultural property found
therein. 261 Most source nations, like Italy and Turkey, have so many
archaeologically important sites that it would literally take an army to protect
them-and those are just the sites about which the Italian and Turkish
2 57 See generally id. at 135-36.
2 58 Id.
259 CUNO, supra note 14, at 9.
260 Id.261 Merryman, supra note 56, at 159.
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governments are aware. 262 Furthermore, many source nations and local
museums already have so many culturally important objects within their
possession that they lack the institutional and human resources to ever be
able to catalogue, preserve, and display them.263 Thus, market nations,
universal museums, and private collectors do not see why source nations
should not share the cultural property which they cannot protect and display
as adequately as a universal museum or private collector. 264
B. Potential Solutions to Cultural Property Disputes Unique to
Mediation
With all of these interests in mind, it is helpful to examine a series of
potential solutions that mediation offers to competing disputant-stakeholders
in international cultural property disputes. For example, when a source nation
seeks to repatriate a piece of its cultural property from a universal museum in
a powerful and well-resourced market nation, a conscientious mediator might
be able to frame the dispute in an "object-oriented" manner.265 Framing the
dispute in such a way calls for disputants to decide who should possess an
object based upon the outcomes of three considerations: (1) which disputant
can best preserve the object; (2) which disputant can best glean the historical,
scientific, cultural, and aesthetic truths from the object; and (3) which
disputant can best grant the public access to the object.266 Negotiations with a
mediator who frames the dispute this way address a number of stakeholder
interests, like the indefinite preservation of pieces of cultural property and
the assurance of scholarly and public access to important finds. An object-
oriented policy might not explicitly address legitimate claims to objects
based solely upon the grounds of state sovereignty or state identity. However,
by framing a dispute in terms that focus on other important interests, source
nations might be more willing to negotiate to allow market nations to keep
important objects if, for example, market nations either (1) promise to pay
262 BATOR, supra note 30, at 36. Bator also points out that even if source nations
possessed the police resources necessary to protect every site within their borders, there is
no guarantee that these guards would not begin looting sites themselves. Id.
263 MERRYMAN, supra note 56, at 187.
264 See id. at 186-89.
265 Id. at 163-64.
266 Id. at 211.
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the source nations for continued possession, or (2) return the objects to the
source nation once it can prove that it can actually take care of them.
267
Another example of a potential mediated solution might be to arrange the
repatriation of disputed objects in such a way that no party in particular will
lose large amounts of money in the process. This happened in 1993, when the
Michael Ward Gallery of Manhattan agreed to donate a collection of
Mycenaean jewelry and ornaments from the 15th century B.C. worth $1.5
million to the U.S.-based Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage
in Washington that would in turn repatriate them to the Greek people. 268 As
the gallery owner observed, this would not only save him thousands of
dollars in litigation expenses and acknowledge his respect for the sovereignty
of the Greek people, 269 but it would allow his gallery to recover a significant
portion of money it spent to acquire the objects through the tax breaks it
would receive for its donation to a nonprofit. 270
Other potential solutions which mediation is uniquely positioned to
propose are, for example, partage,271 source nations agreeing to "loan" pieces
to universal museums or foreign private collectors for an indefinite period of
time, 272 or, as mentioned above, "renting" or "leasing" pieces to universal
267 An object-oriented policy is a particularly equitable approach to the resolution of
cultural property disputes that extends to objects like the Elgin Marbles, objects allegedly
crucial to a source nation's identity yet removed from their borders long before it was
illegal to do so. For hundreds of years, the British Museum argued that it could not retum
the Marbles in good conscience because the Greeks were not institutionally equipped to
preserve and display to a wide audience the world's best examples of original ancient
Greek sculpture. Susan Emerling, Is Greece Losing Its Elgin Marbles?, HELLENIC TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2009, at A7. However, as of June of 2009, these arguments ring hollow because
Greece has built into the side of the Acropolis a state-of-the-art, $200 million, 226,000-
square-foot museum designed specifically to display the Elgin Marbles and other
important works discovered in Athens. Suzanne Muchnic, Showcase for the Acropolis,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, at E14. The museum overlooks the city and features a glass-
encased top floor into which light will pour and emblazon the highly conditioned and
filtered air around the space set aside for the Marbles. Id. This museum proves that
Greece has the resources to preserve the Marbles. Id. It will attract tourists and grant
scholars the ideal setting in which to examine the Marbles. Id.
268 Rita Reif, Greece and Gallery Settle, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, at C2.
269 Id.
270 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 60.
271 See supra Part III.B.4; CuNO, supra note 14, at xxxiii, 14.
272 See, e.g., Janice Arnold, Recovered Nazi-Looted Art to Remain in Spain with Ex-
Owner, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, Mar. 8, 2007, at 25.
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museums or foreign private collectors for an indefinite period of time. 273
These three options are important because they allow source nations to
reinforce their state sovereignty by retaining title to a great number of objects
leaving their borders while at the same time granting market nations and their
citizens access to important objects foreign to them.
V. CONCLUSION
Mediation is the best means by which to settle international cultural
property disputes. It encourages disputant-stakeholders-whether they be
universal or local museums, source or market nations-to cooperatively
negotiate mutually beneficial and highly creative agreements that respect
every disputant-stakeholder's interests.274 Such resolutions are imperative if
we wish to put a stop to the near total embargoes that source nations have
currently placed on international transmission of cultural property.275 This is
particularly true in light of the facts that (1) current legal regimes governing
the international transmission of cultural property, which operate largely on a
litigation basis and include the UNESCO Convention, have failed to
adequately protect source nations and (2) more and more source nation
cultural property slips out of their borders and into foreign hands on a daily
basis. 276 While disputed interests like state sovereignty, identity, and
imperialistic perceptions that universal museums are the "best" at displaying
cultural property are important to keep in mind, much more is at stake than
source or market nation pride. At stake is knowledge itself. Unless disputant-
stakeholders engage in a system which creatively encourages the equitable
spread of cultural property-one which acknowledges the interests of all
stakeholders-it is likely that the world will someday face a complete freeze
on the exchange of newly discovered archaeological, artistic, and historically
significant objects which inform who we are as a human race. At the end of
the day, it is this tragedy, more than any other, that mediation helps
overcome. This, regardless of its voluntary nature, is why disputant-
stakeholders must embrace mediation.
273 See Palmer, supra note 148, at 280.
274 GAZZINI, supra note 142, at 62.
275 See BATOR, supra note 30, at 10.
276 See MERRYMAN, supra note 56, at 210; see also Merryman, supra note 227, at
268.
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